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ABSTRACT  
 
Political scientists have long studied the connection between macroeconomic 
performance and presidential approval, electoral success, and voter satisfaction. Given the 
purported relationship between economic anxiety and votes for Donald Trump, a better 
understanding of this relationship is timely. The present analysis improves upon the economic 
voting literature by assessing this connection in an experimental context. Using data collected 
from undergraduate students and a Mechanical Turk sample, this analysis measures differences 
in opinion between control respondents and treatment respondents who received various 
economic fear stimuli. In addition, the analysis questions whether policy opinions differ based on 
the interaction between a treatment and income level, and whether certain types of economic fear 
are more likely to shift policy opinions. This analysis finds that economic fear is not pervasive 
enough to shift policy support, but a variety of weak differences due to income interactions and 
fear-stimuli exist. Largely, this piece accords with analyses performed using nationally 
representative samples and defines American policy opinions as largely driven by income, 
education, and party identification.  
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The 2016 Presidential election highlighted economic anxiety’s national salience. The race 
between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump pitted a candidate who was supportive of the Obama 
Administration’s policies and legacy against one whose campaign tactics directly contradicted 
Republican political decorum. What the real estate and reality television star, Donald Trump 
presented was an economic fear tactic accumulating in a strategy of taking improbable societal 
changes and making citizens feel as if other candidates would leave their lives in peril. Although 
the present research is not aimed as a direct response to Trump’s election, its timing proves 
pertinent to explain the degree to which economic fear explains his success (Casselman, 2017). 
As many Americans are feeling economically lost or forgotten, gaining a real understanding of 
how this economic fear translates into political reality is a necessity. The present analysis seeks 
to demonstrate the causal mechanisms behind economic fear and subsequent vote decisions. 
Given the pervasive economic rhetoric that shaped the 2016 election and the ultimate outcome, 
this study stands to explain how individuals translate short term economic angst into real 
opinions on policies and politician preferences.   
The following paper approaches a distinctive view of political economy literature. Many 
political scientists have looked at the important relationship between economic conditions and 
vote choice. The largest portion of the literature focuses on Presidential and Congressional 
voting in the United States. Studying this relationship progresses political science because 
comprehending the connection between the economy and vote choice enables scholars to better 
predict election outcomes, understand the actions of rational politicians, and better gauge how 
the electorate transforms economic perceptions into a specific voting behavior. Furthermore, 
these concepts are not limited to scholars, but can be disseminated to journalists and the public. 
This paper attempts to improve upon the economic voting literature by obtaining experimental 
data to better tease out the causality behind how economic fear impacts policy support. In 
addition, rather than focusing on the sociotropic versus pocketbook voting argument, the present 
analysis sheds light on attitudes toward redistribution; specifically how these attitudes impact 
individuals’ willingness to support equalizing social policy in the United States. This separate 
literature is vastly important to the present question, as demand for redistribution is shaped by 
economic adjustments, and acts as a source of economic fear for the poor and wealthy alike.  
Much of the following work uses large-scale data sets to test this relationship. The 
traditional economic voting literature relies on observational data. Prior results have not reliably 
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demonstrated the extent to which economic fear specifically influences voting behavior as 
opposed to other independent variables. The primary focus of this paper is not to address the 
presidential realm directly, but rather to question how economic perceptions impact opinions on 
certain policies. Contrary to politicians, policies are tangible; they morph and shape a country’s 
position in the global environment, and they directly impact citizens more than politicians in a 
democracy. Questioning the relationship between economic perceptions and policy support 
assists a conclusion regarding the behavior individuals resort to during periods of economic 
unrest. A second goal is to understand how rational politicians should propose these policies to 
best meet their constituents’ preferences. Generally, this analysis relies on the opinions of 
college-aged respondents who are likely to be anxious about their finances in the near future as 
they finish their education and enter the job market. In addition, a survey using a Mechanical 
Turk sample will provide a more representative dataset. The results from this analysis prove 
generalizable, because the economic fear treatment is not exclusive to 18-22 year olds, but is a 
clear cycle throughout an individual’s lifetime as one deals with debt, professional and family 
financial stress, and retirement.  
Literature Review 
I. A Look Back: The Origins of Economic Voting Studies 
The relationship between the economy and politics is long-studied, and the correlation 
between the two fields offers much room for societal explanations. Tufte stated convincingly, 
“When you think economics, think elections; when you think elections, think economics 
(1978).” Ronald Reagan certainly understood the implications of economic voting when he 
requested that voters derive preferences based on their sociotropic economic opinions during 
Jimmy Carter’s final year in office. Yet, literature predates this famed political occurrence; 
beginning in the 1950s, Downs and Key began assessing and testing hypotheses connecting ideas 
of rationality and voting behavior (1957 and 1966). In Downs’ seminal book, An Economic 
Theory of Democracy, he posits that for voters to meet their maximum personal utility, they 
compare utility differences per party and vote for the party that would complete this utility 
maximization in the future (1957). Downs proposes that the rational voter “ground[s] his voting 
decision on current events [rather] than purely on future ones” (1957). Therefore, the rational 
voter compares the utility provided by the incumbent party to that of the opposition, had that 
party been in power in the current period. Using “trend factors,” that is, applying the trends from 
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the current period to what can be expected in the future, as well as “performance ratings” of 
present political success, the rational voter can then apply the information from the current 
period to make a prospective decision for her future (Downs, 1957). This establishes rational 
decision-making in the economic voting field. Key’s The Responsible Electorate analyzes “stand 
patters” and “shifters” in elections from 1936 to 1960 and focuses less on economic theory than 
data analysis (1966). Key contends that voters rely on the incumbent’s performance to inform 
their vote choice:  
The patterns of flow of the major streams of shifting voters graphically reflect the 
electorate in its great…role as an appraiser of past events, past performance and 
past actions. It judges retrospectively; it commands prospectively only insofar as 
it expresses either approval or disapproval of that which has happened before 
(1966).  
Key provides the primary argument for retrospective behavior: voters act in their self-
interest by selecting whatever party benefitted them in the past. These clashing ideologies, one 
prospective and the other retrospective, act as the kindle for over 400 analyses of economic 
voting (Lewis-Beck, 2000).  
These original pieces influence academics from both the U.S. and Great Britain to 
question the economic variables voters use, the timing in which these variables are put into play, 
and how they impact incumbent versus non-incumbent elections. In this sense, two different 
theories emerge. The first, and most largely supported theory is that of sociotropic voting 
(Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, Kramer, 1983). A sociotropic voter forms his or her vote decision 
based off an evaluation of national economic conditions. This contrasts what is referred to as 
pocketbook voting, where one focuses on how their own personal conditions adjusted under a 
president and votes for a presidential candidate accordingly (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979). 
Sociotropic voting tends to lend itself to the retrospective ideology, whereas pocketbook voting 
is often associated with prospective behavior (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). Using individual time-
series data from 1956 to 1972, Fiorina questioned whether citizens vote for or against the 
incumbent’s party as a function of their “present economic condition” (Fiorina, 1981). He finds 
that for presidential elections, pocketbook conditions have a statistically significant impact on 
vote choice (Fiorina, 1981). Between 1956 and 1972, Fiorina finds voters who evaluated their 
economic position as “the same” or “better” than one year before the election were more likely to 
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support the incumbent party (1981). This work hinders Key’s belief that voters look 
retrospectively to form their vote choice and supports the Downsian model (Woon, 2012).  
Yet, the pocketbook-effect is not upheld throughout the entirety of the literature. Kinder 
and Kiewiet’s equally seminal analysis upholds sociotropic decision making (1979). They utilize 
cross-sectional data to question how economic perceptions impact votes for Presidential and 
Congressional candidates and find “American voters resemble the sociotropic ideal” (Kinder and 
Kiewiet, 1979). Their conclusions accord with Downs and Key; voters who act sociotropically 
certainly vote retrospectively by questioning the past performance under the incumbent, but 
these voters also rationally account for future aspirations (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979).  
Further still, discussion of economic voting theory would be incomplete without mention 
of Kramer’s 1983 The Ecological Fallacy Revisited. Kramer lights into sociotropic voting 
propositions, most specifically Kinder and Kiewiet’s work, because they use individual-level 
rather than aggregate-level data (1983, 1979). Furthermore, Kramer posits that individual-level 
data are subject to “statistical artifact” (1983). He contends that changes in individuals’ welfare 
consist of components that cannot be seen because they are “government induced,” exogenous, 
and apolitical occurrences (Kramer, 1983). Kramer suggests that analyses like Fiorina’s serve as 
better estimates of voter’s economic decision making (1981). Kramer concludes that aggregating 
data allows for a distinction between self-interest and sociotropic behavior, and regressing 
individual level cross-sectional votes on economic perceptions does not reveal sociotropic 
attitudes (Kramer, 1983).  
Ansolabehere, Meredith, and Snowberg question Kramer’s sociotropic proposition using 
both cross-sectional and time series survey data (2014). They propose a theory of “mecro-
economic voting” whereby voters use signals about the aggregate economy to evaluate its 
condition. The authors use data comprised of individual macroeconomic assessments as well as 
using aggregate time-series data. Based on individual level data, they find that if a group 
(demographic, age, education) realizes a higher unemployment rate, then they also report higher 
levels of unemployment for the national economy (Ansolabehere et. al, 2014). Therefore there 
may be reason to believe that respondents who receive an economic fear treatment will perceive 
economic conditions and the correlating policies in a different perspective. In general, 
Ansolabehere et. al propose that any work that disregards individual economic attitudes will be 
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biased. This balances Kramer’s macro push with many other scholars’ micro approach (Lewis-
Beck, 1988, Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, Hopkins, 2012, Bartels, 2013).  
II. Looking Ahead: Modern Political Economy Research,  
Redistribution, and Hypotheses 
Yet, this analysis moves beyond methodological debates. Namely, the literature reviewed 
above sets the stage: economic voting encompasses a debate between the rational, pocketbook 
voter, and the sociotropic voter in either a retrospective or prospective time period.  The present 
analysis will not close the door on field encompassing theories, but some more recent studies add 
their own take on the debate, and inspire this research.  
Using individual level American National Election Studies (ANES) data, Anderson, 
Duch, and Palmer examine how media exposure, political attitudes, and personal and 
socioeconomic experiences impact individuals’ macroeconomic comprehension (2000). Their 
study concludes that citizens are more likely to use these assessors in times of economic 
downturn, and other factors than the government’s economic record influence citizens’ vote 
choice (Anderson et. al, 2000). Furthermore, they highlight individual level, rather than 
aggregated data, because individual level data specifically capture how the above variables 
impact vote choice. The present analysis benefits from this finding as it relies upon individual 
survey data to generalize the impact economic fear has on policy support. Additionally, the 
finding that individuals rely on outside sources during periods of distress provides evidence that 
an economic fear treatment could trigger a reaction to a policy that differs from an opinion under 
normal conditions.  
Similarly, Hopkins (2012) looks at how individuals perceive economic conditions during 
periods of unequal growth. Hopkins updates conclusions about sociotropic voting from the 1970s 
and 1980s in light of income inequality. Using 1978-2010 Michigan Survey of Consumer 
Attitudes responses, he tests whether individuals vote on sociotropic evaluations of the economy, 
or whether these votes occur relative to the economic performance of the rich (Hopkins, 2012). 
Quite optimistically, compared to Anderson et. al, Hopkins concludes that “sociotropic voting 
based on national economic assessments has provided a pathway through which the poor’s 
economic condition shapes American politics” (2000, 2012). He finds less wealthy individuals 
have not developed more negative opinions of their own situations simply because others earn 
more (Hopkins, 2012). Furthermore, for both the rich and poor, economic assessments consider 
the performance of all class levels, not just their own (Hopkins, 2012).  
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Hopkins’ findings lend well to research on redistributive attitudes (2012). Focusing on 
major industrial countries outside of the United States, Cavaillé and Trump find that support for 
government income redistribution is statistically different from support for policies providing 
assistance to the poor (2014). And in concordance with Hopkins’ analysis, Cavaillé and Trump 
find that income does not predict how individuals feel about redistributive policies (2012 and 
2014). Furthermore, they demonstrate that attitudes toward redistribution vary based on whether 
the individual is thinking in the frame of a contributor or a recipient of assistance (Cavaillé and 
Trump, 2014). These findings, set in the sociotropic framework developed by previous research, 
contribute to the first hypothesis:  
H1: Economic anxiety will lead respondents to increase support for social welfare 
policies where they would derive benefit (Affordable Care Act, welfare, student loan 
debt forgiveness); it will lead to decreased support for policies where assistance is 
provided to an out-group (immigration).   
Utilizing county-level data, Hansford and Gomez find a causal link between economic 
conditions in the year leading to the election and vote choice when there is no incumbent 
candidate (2015). They assume an incumbent clouds voters’ perceptions because they have set 
definitions of who that candidate is (Hansford and Gomez, 2015). Yet, a nonincumbent from the 
same party has a greater opportunity of recognition without presidential performance 
assumptions (Hansford and Gomez, 2015). Additionally, while Hansford and Gomez, as well as 
research by Reeves and Gimpel, emphasize analyzing local data, the current analysis assumes 
those surveyed are more attuned to sociotropic conditions rather than local, pocketbook, 
considerations while responding (2015, 2012). This is because younger respondents are more 
transient and looking to enter the national job market, not just a local arena.  
To analyze the impact of economic conditions on electoral choice, Woon (2012) 
conducted a laboratory experiment. Subjects played an incomplete information game multiple 
times, acting as both a voter and a politician. Woon finds a tendency for subjects to vote 
retrospectively: looking at a politician’s general success in the past (2012). Subsequently, 
politicians in the game act in the best interest of the voters (Woon, 2012). Moreover, Woon 
employs the political psychology use of a heuristic to describe this retrospective behavior (2012). 
Accordingly, retrospective-sociotropic perspectives act as a shortcut for voters attempting to 
maximize utility through voting (Woon 2012). This retrospective assumption justifies the 
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perceptions survey respondents have when forming policy opinions. Woon’s findings imply that 
rational politicians account for the preferences of the voter (2012). 
Also in the experimental realm, Trump ran three experiments testing how public opinion 
on income differentials is affected by income inequality itself (2016). She finds that opinions on 
income inequality in the United States face influence from individuals’ experience with poverty 
and their personal knowledge about national income inequality (Trump, 2016). Effectively, her 
research shows that greater levels of inequality actually increase tolerance for inequality (Trump, 
2016). These findings contrast the rationality assumptions underlying much of the economic-
grounded literature (Downs, 1953 and Key, 1966). Trump’s “adjustment hypothesis” instead 
posits that the human response to targeted inequality is more fluid and subject to non-traditional 
behavior when describing where demand is derived from (2016).  
The recent research confirming sociotropic perceptions of economic success along with 
the development of the adjustment hypothesis, leads to:  
H2:  Contrary to H1, for respondents earning less than $50,000 over the next year, 
an economic fear treatment will decrease support for all policies (Affordable Care 
Act, welfare, student loan debt forgiveness, immigration).  
Two other aspects of the economic voting literature precede this analysis. Research on 
emotions and voting decisions seek to understand how varying personal and societal factors 
impact an individual’s vote choice. The present piece fits this domain, as it seeks to understand 
not only how economic changes are perceived (sociotropically is the current assumption), but 
also how economic changes subsequently translate into support for or against a specific policy.  
Banks analyzes the anger that rippled through the U.S. after the 2008 recession (2016). 
Specifically, he asks whether white anger causes decreased support for policies stereotypically 
thought to benefit minorities (Banks, 2016). Working in the political psychology realm, Banks 
defines an anger experience as that of personal threat where the individual knows who is 
responsible (2016). The present research will do the same with a focus on economic induced 
fear. Banks experimented with 180 subjects; after inducing an anger treatment, he finds that 
whites who score high on the “ethnocentric scale” – those who are very closely associated with 
their in-group – are more likely to oppose racial immigration policies than are the control group 
who are equally ethnocentric but are not exposed to the anger treatment (2016).  
Interestingly, Banks finds that for a small subset of whites who score low 
ethnocentrically, that is they relate with out-groups more than their white in-group, the anger 
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treatment actually creates greater support for policies thought to benefit minorities (2016). 
Traditionally, economic voting literature has not concerned itself with such details, but the 
relatively small and personal scale of this research demands attention.  Therefore, if the present 
research finds that whites that undergo economic fear support certain policies at the same rate as 
minorities, some of the explanation may be due to ethnocentric identification.  
Similar to Banks, three additional pieces question American’s opinions on out-groups or 
responsiveness to economic changes, and lend well to the design of the present study. Brader, 
Valentino, and Suhay use experimental methods and find that news pieces about the costs of 
Latino immigration create significantly more opposition than those about European immigrants 
(Brader et. al, 2008). Therefore using newspaper articles as treatments can trigger reactions from 
subjects. Work by Simonovitz relies on fictional reports from expert economists and tests how 
presidential approval is impacted by these expert testimonies (2015). He finds that a reported 10 
percent improvement in economic conditions resulted in a 5 percent increase in respondent 
presidential approval (2015). Lastly, Zaller and Feldman use ANES data and posit that 
respondents are actually quite vulnerable to short-term opinions or thoughts that are “on top of 
their head.” (1992). This finding provides additional support for experimental survey 
methodology, as using a treatment can induce a feelings that may change policy opinions.  
In addition, and preceding H3, work by Bloom and Price demonstrate that voters are 
quite responsive to changes in unemployment and subsequent short-term changes in income 
(1975). Subsequently, Kiewiet finds that voters are conscientious of unemployment and hold 
politicians responsible for poor economic conditions (1981). Furthermore, Kiewiet’s regression 
analysis reveals that individuals are likely to punish politicians for rising unemployment even if 
they were not directly impacted (1981). This lends support for unemployment’s sociotropic 
impact. but it also demonstrates that voters understand the link between unemployment and 
political power. This proves logical because unemployment is a relatively simple concept that 
individuals can relate with regardless of their personal experience. On the contrary, very little 
research questions how individuals translate GDP changes into votes or policy opinions. GDP 
remains a more abstract concept used as a broad indicator of economic growth; unemployment 
appears to be more a better indicator both in the literature and by the fact that individuals gain 
experience with unemployment (locally) without seeking third party information.    
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The findings on the effectiveness of newspaper article treatments, individual’s response 
to short term stimuli, and unemployment’s significant effect on voter’s preferences leads to H3 
(Banks, 2016, Brader et. al, 2008, Simonovitz, 2015, Zaller and Feldman, 1992, Bloom and 
Price, 1975,  Kiewiet 1981): 
H3 (2015): For the Mechanical Turk sample there will be a more pronounced 
response for the unemployment treatment than for the GDP treatment (anti-
immigration, pro-Affordable Care Act, pro-welfare, pro-student loan debt 
forgiveness).    
In summary, the economic voting literature is sweeping, evolving, and questioning how 
the changing national economy impacts voters’ behavior. Early work formalized the 
responsibility and actions of rational voters. The literature during the 1970s and 1980s takes 
advantage of databases and more advanced statistical techniques to question the relevance of 
sociotropic versus pocketbook voting. More recently, mass survey techniques help scholars 
administer treatments and better understand how different aspects of the changing economy 
impact vote choice. A large majority of this research has focused on the national level. This 
research follows that trend, but instead of evaluating choices for or against candidates, the 
present analysis evaluates impacts on different policies. This research aims to expand on recent 
immigration conclusions by also including welfare, student loan debt forgiveness, and universal 
healthcare as policies under purview. Employing an economic fear treatment will allow for a 
greater comprehension of how similar shocks impact voters’ opinions of tangible policies, rather 
just opinions of politicians’ performance.  
Below is a summation of the hypotheses to be tested:  
Hypothesis 1:  H1: Economic anxiety will lead respondents to increase support for social 
welfare policies (Affordable Care Act, Welfare, Student Loan Debt 
Forgiveness) where they would derive benefit; it will lad to decreased 
support for policies where assistance is provided to an outgroup 
(immigration).  
 
Hypothesis 2:  Contrary to H1, for respondents earning less than $50,000 over the next 
year, an economic fear treatment will decrease support for all policies 
(Affordable Care Act, Welfare, Student Loan Debt Forgiveness, 
Immigration).  
 
Hypothesis 3:  For the Mechanical Turk sample there will be a more pronounced response 
for the unemployment treatment than for the GDP treatment (anti-
immigration, pro-Affordable Care Act, pro-welfare, pro-student loan debt 
forgiveness).    
 
The next section describes the research design and survey methods employed as well as special 
considerations due to the data used in this procedure. 
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Research Design 
This research employs two survey experiments to test causal mechanisms behind policy 
support. In particular, the experimental design allows for analysis of whether economic fear 
impacts policy preferences. An experimental model allows for manipulating economic fear 
through random subject assignment to treatments that describe different aspects of the economy 
in a variety of conditions. The policies in question are immigration, The Affordable Care Act, 
welfare, student loan debt forgiveness, and a foreign policy commitment. Questioning the impact 
on policy renders this research somewhat unique in the economic voting field, as most previous 
work focuses almost solely on the impact of economic conditions on support for or against an 
incumbent candidate or party (Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, Weisberg, 2011, and Abramowitz, 
20161). An experimental approach provides results that inform what kinds of economic fear have 
causal impacts on specific public policies.  
The causal power of economic fear proves important to explore because of its salience in 
society in general, but it is especially pertinent in wake of the most recent presidential election. 
With the election of Donald Trump, the status of the U.S. and global economy is largely in 
question. President Trump’s campaign rhetoric involved significantly controversial policies apt 
to change global markets and the direction of capitalism and social welfare in the U.S.  
To gauge this fear from a more targeted response group, the first survey experiment was 
delivered solely to college undergraduate college students. The survey was randomly 
administered to participants recruited by class list serves, Facebook posts, and word of mouth.2 
All respondents took the survey online and had no identifying characteristics in their answers. 
Respondents were randomly given a control or treatment version of the survey. This experiment 
subscribes to techniques commonly used by political scientists to create a stimulus: newspaper 
articles (Einstein and Glick, 2014, Simonivits, 2015, Alt and Lassen, 2014, Brader et. al, 2008). 
For the undergraduate survey, the newspaper articles were renditions of Boston University’s 
Daily Free Press. The Daily Free Press is an on-campus newspaper distributed in most of the 
main buildings. It is easily accessible, its articles are available online, and students on campus 
can refer to it for relevant local, national, and global news written by undergraduates. Both the 
																																																								
1 Time For Change Model  
2 See Perkins for comprehensive techniques and strategies used to recruit undergraduate survey 
respondents (2011).  
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control and treatment groups received newspaper articles identical to the online format of Daily 
Free Press articles. The control stimulus is an article titled “Looking Ahead: Job Market as 
Expected for Upcoming Grads” (reproduced below and in larger size in the appendix). The 
article describes fictional undergraduate job market statistics and two fictional accounts from 
students entering the job market. The article simply describes this situation as status quo. The 
control article provides no stimulus to capture responses to the policies under normal conditions.    
Contrarily, the treatment stimulus was titled, “Should you Be Concerned? Fear on 
Campus Imminent as Jobs Disappear” (reproduced below). The treatment refers to the same 
statistics as the control but puts them in a negative light. The article (fictionally) reports only 25 
percent of 2016 college graduates obtaining adequate employment. In addition, the treatment 
provides the same two personal accounts as the control article, but both students are struggling 
despite having good GPAs, employable majors and backgrounds, and or having applied to many 
jobs. Lastly, like the control article, the treatment describes an on campus survey whereby 68 
percent of respondents were “worried about their ability to find adequate work in a rapidly 
changing economy.” Overall the treatment stimulus aims to create an economic fear response for 
the undergraduate student respondents. The treatment mirrors the control article except for the 
facts and photo. The treatment employs no references to politics or policies.  
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One concern is whether the stimulus has relevance to students who are planning on 
attending graduate school directly after college. This analysis assumes students attending 
graduate school still have career goals in mind, and that the negative economic conditions 
described will still have tangible results on these students. This relies on the sociotropic 
perspective: those students attending graduate school will read the article with concerns about 
the ability of lots of college graduates to find employment, not just themselves. The treatment’s 
statistics apply to the respondent and their immediate cohort, but also to their friends at 
universities across the country. The treatment intends to impact the respondent’s view of 
economic conditions at large and question the inherent consequences. Relying on the sociotropic 
perspective is appropriate because of the tight-knit network most students have through social 
media and cellular communication. Therefore, the stimulus applies to individuals pursuing 
graduate school as well as those who are hoping to enter the job market after graduation.  
Regarding newspaper design decisions, the Daily Free Press was chosen instead of 
national or international news sources to have specific references to student related economic 
issues. In addition, the Daily Free Press does not have a strict liberal or conservative connotation 
unlike some national sources like the New York Times or Wall Street Journal. This is essential 
because this experiment seeks to have the economic treatment explain opinions on policy rather 
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than innate political biases. This goal is derived from Alt and Lassen’s work on the Danish 
population (2014). They utilize a survey experiment among other methods (population level data 
and multivariate regression) to reject the theory that political party endogeneity controls 
sociotropic economic opinions (Alt and Lassen, 2014).  Therefore, the present work aims to 
uphold their endogeneity finding by ensuring all aspects of the stimulus are non-political. In 
addition, at Boston University, the Daily Free Press is not the main news source for the majority 
for students. This is important because it is possible that a respondent could recognize the 
fictitious nature of the article. For that reason, neither the control or treatment articles have dates. 
Regardless, even if an individual recognizes the deception used in the articles, they will receive 
stimulus because the statistics and stories relate directly to their wellbeing after graduation.  
Most importantly, newspaper articles provide an important source of external validity to 
the study results. Unlike vignettes and other artificial manipulations used to mask treatments, a 
newspaper article from a reputable source the respondent relates with is a more accurate 
representation of a natural experiment. A newspaper article treatment aims to measure the 
response individuals have when they read an article, get an update on their phone, or catch a 
headline on television. These instances occur multiple times per day for most individuals and 
therefore are a relevant way to distribute information to respondents. Yet, this treatment 
technique is not without its flaws. While the articles provide ample external validity, there is a 
running risk that the results do not stem from the treatment article alone (Einstein and Glick, 
2014). In fact, this weakness is likely exaggerated at present because of the political climate in 
the United States. Individuals remain heightened to the initiation of the Trump Administration 
and there is a very real possibility that the measured results are not wholly due to the treatment. 
Yet, this internal validity weakness proves worthwhile for the external validity gains. Moreover, 
because the treatment articles are apolitical, individuals are less likely to base their responses on 
political feelings rather than the stimuli presented. In addition, the internal validity loss due to 
the Trump Administration’s pervasiveness does not totally harm the results. Due to heightened 
economic anxiety, respondents may be more prone to grasp the relevance of the treatment and 
apply sociotropic responses. Lastly, due to the relative homogeneity of the student group, it is 
appropriate to assume that the economic fear stimulus is applicable to this demographic at large. 
This presents one advantage of using a well-defined group such as “undergraduate college 
students” rather than a more variable group such as “voting age U.S. citizens.” The 
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generalizability afforded by the undergraduate sample provides a valid and worthwhile group to 
test the present hypotheses and offers a unique target group to understand the results.  
 In addition to the undergraduate survey, this study benefits from a wider pool of 
respondents. A second economic fear experiment was conducted using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). Three studies by Berinsky et. al., Boas, Christenson, and Glick and Leeper and 
Mullinix found that MTurk samples do an appropriate job replicating experimental findings 
(2012, 2013, 2014). Three different methods were compared when deciding how to field survey 
respondents. The first option is the most costly for a large sample: using a professional surveying 
firm to field the survey. While this provides a representative sample, it comes at a cost beyond 
the scope of this project. Next is relying on a convenience sample like MTurkers or purchasing 
Facebook ads to attract individuals to the survey. Amazon MTurk is chosen here instead of 
Facebook advertisements for a few reasons. Firstly, MTurk responses are less costly than 
Facebook responses (Boas, Christenson, and Glick, 2013). While Boas, Christenson, and Glick 
find that MTurk and Facebook are about equally biased away from results in probability 
samples, the lower cost of MTurk sampling gives it the upper hand in the present study (2013). 
Additionally, MTurk response speed and the ability to pay without exchanging identifying 
information make it a clear choice for a convenience survey targeting over 500 responses.  
While just applying the treatment to the undergraduate sample would likely be an 
interesting standalone test, using an MTurk sample allows for more data collection, a slightly 
more age-diverse sample, and different treatments. It allows for a more diverse understanding of 
how economic fear impacts opinions on public policies and is intended to enhance external 
validity. Furthermore, utilizing multiple treatments ensures that different orientations of 
economic fear are derived and their resulting impacts on public policy opinions can be 
compared. The MTurk survey consisted of a control and two treatment stimuli. To avoid political 
connotation, the newspaper articles are displayed as USA Today articles. There are no dates on 
the articles, but both the control and first treatment article refer to “September.” Each article is 
kept fairly short for two purposes. Having a shorter article is beneficial so that respondents pay 
complete attention to the content and do not have too much information to comprehend in a short 
period of time. Secondly, having a shorter piece ensures respondents can easily recall the 
information when responding to the policy questions.  
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The control article is titled, “By the Numbers: Breaking Down the September Jobs 
Report.” The article serves as a fact-driven report on the U.S. Labor Department jobs report with 
fictional numbers. The control article demonstrates neither economic up nor downturn. The 
intent is that most readers will read the article and feel no different about the economic stability 
of the country. The control group may feel more informed about how the jobs report is measured, 
how many jobs were added and in what sectors, but there should be no fear or un-normal 
emotions after reading the article.  
                 
The unemployment treatment article features a poor jobs report and rising 
unemployment. Its title reads, “By the Numbers: September Jobs Report Shows Rising 
Unemployment.” The treatment describes job loss and imminent economic decline. It features 
descriptions and affirmations by a fictional Federal Reserve economist, Brookings Institute 
economist, and a negative anecdote from a fictional steel manufacturing employee. This 
treatment benefits monthly Bureau of Labor Statistics jobs reports. Since the statistics change 
relatively frequently, respondents are less likely to recognize the deception in the treatment. If 
respondents recognize the deception, the tone and facts reported in the stimulus is likely to create 
economic fear. In addition, the treatment will create the economic fear stimulus regardless of 
what form of employment respondents have. Unlike the undergraduate treatment, the article is 
informative and does not target a specific demographic. Writing about the economy at large 
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guides respondents to assess the policy questions in regard to economic fear they feel for the 
country at large rather than potential personal unease. Using the jobs report to evoke economic 
fear followed the assumption that individuals respond to unemployment as one of the most 
tangible indicators of the national economy (Eisenberg and Ketcham, 2004).3  
               
The second MTurk experimental treatment’s article reads, “By the Numbers: Falling 
GDP Hints at Economic Decline.” The main stimulus is the fictional fact that “GDP decreased 
by .5 percent.” Similar to the unemployment MTurk treatment, there are economist references in 
order to support the facts listed in the article. The decline in GDP is explained by parts of its 
whole: disposable personal income, net exports, and investment. Using a GDP treatment is 
beneficial for two reasons: firstly, there is a chance that the unemployment treatment has no 
impact on respondent’s opinions of the policies in question, and using a GDP decrease should 
provide a stimulus if unemployment is ineffective. Secondly, it allows for a comprehension of 
whether different types of economic fear impact policy opinions similarly. The concepts used to 
describe the GDP decrease are easy to comprehend and are not described in a manner to confuse 
respondents  (Cohen, 2016).  
The article is informative, and it does not take a tone other than describing the negative 
impact of decreased GDP. Respondents will understand that these factors are all in decline and 																																																								
3 According to their 2004 study, each one-point increase in unemployment over a year correlates 
with a 9.2 percentage point decline in incumbent vote share.  
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associate that to the status of the country as a whole. A GDP treatment accords to the sociotropic 
perspective. Respondents will be prone to think about the performance of the national economy 
rather than just their own personal economic angst. This distinction primes individuals to think 
of larger implications of social policies. The GDP treatment is valid regardless of the 
respondent’s profession and employment status. GDP impacts all individuals within a country: it 
drives economic trends and helps companies forecast their business strategies. It is also at the 
heart of the macroeconomy: as the GDP moves so does the nation.    
    
Survey Response Strategies 
The survey consists of two parts for both the undergraduate and MTurk pools. First, 
respondents were randomly assigned either a control or treatment article, and after reading the 
article, respondents answered several survey questions. All surveys were administered online. 
This eliminates surveyor bias. Eliminating this bias is especially important in the undergraduate 
pool where the survey issuer could potentially know the respondent. MTurk and undergraduate 
respondents answered the same survey questions.4 The survey headings asks respondents to, 
“Please rate how strongly you agree/disagree with each of the following statements.” For the five 
substantive questions respondents have a choice from a close ended four-point scale: strongly 
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, and strongly disagree.   
																																																								
4 See the appendix for a full outline of the survey and the questions worded as per the online 
surveys.  
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After reading the randomly assigned control or treatment article, respondents answer a 
series of five policy based questions and six demographic questions. The first policy question 
asks respondents to what degree they agree with the statement, “The United States should allow 
immigrants to enter the country legally and should provide means for immigrants to have quality 
education, jobs, and a path to citizenship.” This question gauges the respondents’ opinion on 
immigration. Comparing the control and treatment groups’ response explores the impact of an 
economic fear treatment on immigration policy. Following immigration is a similar question 
regarding the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  
Testing the impact of the ACA will help determine how Americans respond to large-
reaching policies in situations of economic angst. Additionally, this test proves worthwhile 
because health insurance represents an ever-increasing portion of the American budget (both 
corporate and private) (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). With rising premiums and 
technological progress constantly driving up the costs of healthcare, the treatment should 
stimulate accurate concern about an individual’s ability to pay for insurance or the chance that 
their employer may make their insurance opportunities more expensive. Economic fear acts as an 
appropriate prime for this policy because of its controversial nature, and although there has been 
much confusion over the policy, it is nearly synonymous with questions about spending, costs, 
and individual economic impacts. Yet, individuals should view this sociotropically because of 
the policy’s intention to provide universal care.  
Following the ACA question, respondents are asked to provide their opinion on welfare. 
The question asks respondents whether they agree that welfare in the U.S. is too large. This 
question is similar to the ACA question, but it differs because welfare is not a novel policy, its 
existence is not up for debate in congress, and individuals do not face a tax penalty from its 
existence. Like immigration, welfare is a staple policy in the U.S.; the existence of some sort of 
welfare, like the existence of immigration law, is necessary for social stability and some of the 
most important boundaries in the country. Testing the response to welfare under economic fear is 
also contentious. Party identification hypotheses place conservatives against expanding welfare, 
but it is yet to be seen whether economic fear can shift these preferences.  
Following the welfare question, respondents were asked whether they agree that the 
federal government does not provide ample opportunity for student loan debt forgiveness and 
that college students should have more chances to have their debt forgiven. This question applies 
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directly to the undergraduate sample, but all respondents regardless of their education status can 
effectively answer it. Whether economic fear does change respondent’s opinions on student loan 
debt policy is relevant both to policymakers and the general public. During recessions 
individuals may be less likely to pursue college degrees, but a better-educated workforce could 
help the economy prevent further economic decline. To assist this problem, greater government 
loan assistance could encourage individuals to pursue higher education. Yet, during the situations 
presented in the economic fear treatments, individuals have incentive to doubt the government’s 
ability to provide greater assistance. This question therefore combines different aspects of 
policies that provide assistance, but the responses could be predictably different as the benefits of 
student loan forgiveness are more evenly spread across society. Lastly, to capture general 
differences for the samples, a foreign policy question was asked regarding the U.S.’ involvement 
in the Syrian civil war. There should not be significant differences between the treatment and 
control responses to this question, as sociotropic concerns about the national economy and 
sociotropic views of an economy under normal conditions will not change an individual’s 
understanding of the situation in Syria. Large differences in responses between the control and 
treatment groups could be evidence of sampling error or an unintended treatment effect.  
In order to gain valuable information for analysis without priming individuals about 
politics, race, or other sensitive topics, respondents answered demographic questions after 
responding to the policy questions. The survey collected a respondent’s age, gender, race, 
education level, citizenship status, expected pre-tax income, and party identification. All of these 
differences prove necessary for understanding the causal effects on different groups. Yet, it is 
important to point out that the diversity in respondent groups is predictably weak. Boston 
University’s undergraduate student body is 40 percent white and only 18 percent Hispanic or 
black (Boston University Admissions, 2016). In addition, nearly 25 percent of undergraduates 
are international students. Therefore, the undergraduate sample is likely skewed toward white 
respondents and international students. These groups tend to have above average household 
incomes. As per Christenson, Glick, and Boas the MTurk sample also tends to be whiter (2013). 
These biases were considered, but as previously described; timing and location limitations make 
Boston University undergraduates the most viable undergraduate sample and MTurk’s benefits 
secured it as the method to test the unemployment and GDP treatments on a broader sample. 
Undergraduate respondents were entered into a lottery to win Amazon gift cards. MTurk 
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respondents were compensated 40 cents for participation. The MTurk HIT was available to 
respondents over 18 in the United States who had at least a 95% approval rating (Christenson, 
Glick, Boas 2013.) Only one round of surveys were administered over three weeks.  
 
Data Analysis 
 
I. Descriptive Statistics 
After distribution, 258 Boston University students and 889 MTurk respondents 
completed the survey. For the Boston University survey, the average age was 18-25 years old. 
Regarding the race of the respondents, 62.5 percent of the BU respondents were white, 20.3 
percent were Asian, 12.1 percent were Hispanic, and less than 2 percent were African American. 
A whole 92.2 percent of BU respondents are U.S. citizens. Regarding gender, 67.8 percent of the 
BU sample was female, and all BU respondents were pursuing higher education. The income 
distribution was skewed predictably low, with 89.4 percent of BU respondents reporting a pre tax 
income less than $50,000, 75.3 percent of which is below $26,000. Lastly, party identification 
was also skewed in a predictable direction, with 71.8 percent of BU respondents at least leaning 
Democrat, and 21.2 percent of respondents identifying as Independent. The BU sample largely 
represents the average college or university in the United States: majority white, female, 
Democratic, U.S. citizens, with low personal income. More specifically, this sample is quite 
representative of Boston University, yet it lacks enough racial and international diversity to be 
wholly representative.5  
For the MTurk sample, the average age was between 30-40 years old, and 99 percent of 
the sample was less than 70 years old. Regarding race, 77.3 percent of respondents were white, 
10.4 percent were Asian, 16.1 percent were African American, and about 6 percent were 
Hispanic. A commanding majority of 98.5 percent of respondents were U.S. citizens, and the 
sample was majority male (59.6 percent). Less than 1 percent of respondents had less than a 
college degree, 29.6 percent were pursuing a degree, and 43.98 had a bachelor’s degree. 
Therefore, the sample is quite well educated. Regarding pre tax income, 28.5 percent of the 
sample earned less than $26,000, 35 percent earned between $26,000 and $50,000 and 24 percent 
earned between $51,000 and $75,000. About 13 percent of the sample reported earning more 
than $75,000. Regarding party identification, 52.6 percent of the sample identified as at least 																																																								
5 See the “Descriptive Statistics” section in the appendix for full numerical results.  
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leaning Democrat. Independents represent 23.7 percent of the sample and individuals who at 
least lean Republican are 23.7 percent of the sample. Therefore the MTurk sample was about as 
representative as expected given the findings by Boas, Christenson and Glick (2013).6  
 
II. Testing Hypothesis 1  
H1 questions whether the treatment causes significant differences in support for policies 
compared to the control group. Specifically, H1 predicts the Affordable Care Act, welfare, and 
student loan debt forgiveness would receive increased support relative to the control group. 
Policies where an outgroup receives assistance, measured by immigration in the present study, 
will receive less support. Using both Chi-Square (see Figure 1,2 and 3 in appendix) and ordinary 
least square regression analysis, the significant finding for both the BU and MTurk sample is that 
receiving an economic anxiety treatment indeed increases economic pessimism. As demonstrated 
in Table 1, there is a statistically significant difference between the control and treatment groups 
regarding economic pessimism for the MTurk sample. This result is more ambiguous for the BU 
sample as a Chi-Square test of significance (see Figure 3) demonstrates no significant difference 
in pessimism between the two groups, but a regression test (see Table 1) of the economic outlook 
variable against a dummy variable for the treatment group reveals a statistically significant 
difference between the two groups. In fact, the regression for the BU sample demonstrates that 
the treatment alone resulted in a significant .21 point inclination toward economic pessimism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
6 See the “Descriptive Statistics” section in the appendix for full numerical results.  
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Table 1. OLS Regressions: Testing the Treatment Effect  
Unemployment Treatment   Coefficient   Standard Error  
 
Economic Pessimism   0.60   (0.06)*** 
Immigration    0.07   (0.08) 
Affordable Care Act    -0.00   (0.09) 
Welfare      0.08   (0.09) 
Debt Forgiveness    -0.05   (0.08) 
 N:  614 
 
GDP Treatment       
 
Economic Pessimism   0.40   (0.06)*** 
Immigration    0.05   (0.08) 
Affordable Care Act    0.00   (0.09) 
Welfare      -0.02   (0.09) 
Debt Forgiveness    0.01   (0.08)  
 N: 564  
 
BU Treatment        
 
Economic Pessimism   0.21   (0.08)** 
Immigration    -0.00   (0.10) 
Affordable Care Act   0.01   (0.11) 
Welfare      0.02   (0.11) 
Debt Forgiveness    -0.04   (0.11)  
 N: 257 
 R2 : 0.02 
 
* p<.10 
** p<.05 
*** p<.01 (two-tailed tests)  
 
Table 1 further confirms the effectiveness of the treatment on economic opinions: the 
unemployment treatment had a 0.60 increase in respondent pessimism regarding the economy. 
The GDP treatment increased pessimism by 0.40 points. Clearly, using an economic anxiety 
treatment decreases a respondent’s likelihood of viewing the economy in a positive light, all else 
equal. Yet, this does not prove H1; for H1 questions not how opinions on the economy change 
after receiving the stimulus, but how respondent’s opinions on policies are altered under 
situations of economic anxiety.  
Performing a series of Chi-Square (see appendix) and regression tests to parse out 
differences between the control and treatment group responses reveals that for all policies in all 
three control and treatment groups there are no statistically significant differences. H1 predicted 
that under regression analysis, the treatment group should have a positive coefficient for 
immigration (disagreeing that their should be equal opportunity for immigrants), a negative sign 
for healthcare, a positive sign for welfare (because the survey question placed the policy in a 
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negative light), and a negative sign for student debt forgiveness (see appendix for survey 
wording and response options). In concordance with H1, the GDP and unemployment treatment 
groups have positive signs for immigration, while the BU Treatment has a negative coefficient. 
Regarding healthcare, the unemployment treatment group corresponded with H1, while the BU 
treatment group and the GDP treatment group had a negative sign. While testing welfare, the 
GDP treatment had a negative sign, but both the unemployment and BU Treatment groups had 
positive coefficients as predicted by H1. Lastly for college debt forgiveness, The GDP treatment 
group was contrary to H1 with a positive sign while the other two treatments had negative 
coefficients. Yet, since these results are not significantly different from zero, teasing out why a 
contrast exists between the treatment groups proves nonsensical. In addition, respondents were 
asked a nonrelated question regarding U.S. involvement in the Syrian Civil War. No significant 
differences between the control and treatment group were found on this question either. Overall, 
H1 can be overturned due to statistical insignificance and uncoordinated patterns between the 
treatment groups. An economic anxiety treatment neither seems to have the power to change 
policy opinions in general nor in an anticipated direction.  
  
III. Testing Hypothesis 2 
H2 explores whether treatment effects differ by respondent income. Rather than making a 
simple differential between the control and treatment groups, H2 argues that for individuals 
making less than $50,000 (as measured by reported pre-tax income), an economic anxiety 
stimulus will decrease support for all policies. For MTurk respondents, 63 percent of respondents 
reported a pre tax income below $50,000. Therefore the income distribution is quite even for the 
randomized survey. In the BU student group, 89 percent of respondents reported a pre tax 
income below $50,000. This is not surprising, as most undergraduates are not working full time 
positions that would provide a high-income level. The MTurk sample proves to have a greater 
income spread than the BU sample and will be more likely to have significant differences 
between the two groups.  
For each of the three treatment groups, testing the treatment effects based on income relied 
on ordinary least squared regressions. These interaction regressions used the policies and 
economic optimism as the dependent variables. Therefore the regressions measure the treatment 
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effect on the two different income groups: those below $50,000 (low income) and those above 
the threshold (high income). These results are reported in Table 2, 3, and 4 below.   
Table 2. OLS Treatment Effect by Income Level 
Unemployment Treatment    
N:  614     Low Income    High Income   
 
Economic Pessimism    0.65    0.51 
     (0.08)***    (0.10)*** 
 
Immigration    0.20    -0.15 
     (0.10)**    (0.13) 
 
Healthcare     -0.00    0.02    
     (0.11)    (0.15) 
 
Welfare     -0.01    0.24 
     (0.10)    (0.15)* 
 
Debt      -0.11    0.05 	 	 	 	 	 (0.09) 	 	 	 (0.15)	
Table 3.  
GDP Treatment 
N: 564       Low Income    High Income   
 
Economic Pessimism    0.46    0.32 
     (0.08)***    (0.10)*** 
 
Immigration    0.16    -0.13 
     (0.10)    (0.13) 
 
Healthcare    0.03     -0.06 
     (0.12)    (0.16) 
 
Welfare     -0.11    0.16 
     (0.11)    (0.15) 
 
Debt      -0.10    0.17 
     (0.10)    (0.14) 
Table 4.  
BU Treatment  
N: 257      Low Income    High Income   
 
Economic Pessimism    0.22    0.44 
     (0.10)**    (0.33) 
 
Immigration    -0.01    -0.02 
     (0.11)    (0.36) 
 
Healthcare     0.05    -0.30    
     (0.12)    (0.36) 
 
Welfare     0.03    -0.08 
     (0.12)    (0.33) 
 
Debt      -0.05    -0.17 	 	 	 	 	 (0.11) 	 	 	 (0.34) 
 
*10% significance  **5% significance  ***1% significance  	
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Looking at economic outlook for the BU sample, Table 4 reveals that the treatment effect 
was only significant on the low-income respondents. Those with an expected income below 
$50,000 were 0.22 points more likely to view the economy unfavorably. While insignificant, 
higher income respondents were also more likely to view the economy negatively upon receiving 
the treatment. This does little to test H2, but does accord with the finding that the treatment 
shapes sociotropic macroeconomic opinions negatively.  
Next, performing the analysis with immigration as the dependent variable returns no 
statistically significant results with the BU sample. Yet, contrasting H2, the coefficient for low 
income respondents is negative, thus demonstrating that they are more likely to agree that the 
U.S. should continue to provide pathways for legal immigration and immigrant equality. 
Additionally (and still insignificant), Table 4 demonstrates that more wealthy respondents are 
also more likely to agree with more liberal immigration policy. Therefore, the treatment’s impact 
on immigration, while noisy, does not concur with H2.   
As with immigration, the results for the Affordable Care Act are quite noisy with no 
significant results in the BU sample. Table 4 demonstrates that the treatment effect on less 
wealthy respondents creates a tendency to oppose the ACA. While insignificant, the sign of the 
treatment’s coefficient provides weak support for H2. While also insignificant, the treatment’s 
impact on higher income respondents pushes respondents to support the ACA.  
 Similar to the two previous policies, the results for welfare prove insignificant in the BU 
sample. While insignificant, the results provide evidence against H2, as the treatment’s impact 
on lower income respondent increased support for liberal immigration policies. Upon receiving 
the treatment, higher income respondents were more likely to agree that welfare opportunities in 
the U.S. are too expansive. Additionally, as Table 4 demonstrates, there are no significant 
treatment effects for student loan debt forgiveness. Yet, the results also contrast H2:  both low 
income and high-income respondents are more likely to agree that the U.S. should expand 
opportunities for debt forgiveness after receiving the treatment. Generally, the treatment effect in 
the BU sample appears to have no significant impact on respondent’s policy opinions, regardless 
of the respondent’s income level. Therefore, in the BU sample, low-income respondents are not 
more likely to oppose all policies under situations of economic fear, and H2 is overturned.  
 Looking at the MTurk data, the results testing H2 prove nearly as insignificant as the BU 
data. First, focusing on the unemployment treatment group, Table 2 reveals with 99 percent 
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significance that for low-income respondents the unemployment treatment increases 
macroeconomic pessimism by .65 points. Similarly, the unemployment treatment increased 
macroeconomic pessimism for high-income respondents by .51 points. For the GDP treatment 
group (Table 3), low-income respondents increase pessimism by .46 points upon receiving the 
treatment, and high-income respondents increase pessimism by .32 points. This further 
strengthens the positive correlation between economic anxiety’s impact on macroeconomic 
perceptions and demonstrates that lower income individuals are more apt to view the economy 
negatively in situations of economic distress than are high-income individuals.7  
 Looking at the four policies in question, for the unemployment treatment both 
immigration and welfare delivered significant responses. Regarding immigration, an 
unemployment treatment stimulus provides some support in favor of H2: low income 
respondents are .20 points more likely to disagree that the U.S. should continue to provide liberal 
opportunities for immigration (Table 2). This finding is significant with 95 percent confidence. 
Interestingly, although insignificant, higher income respondents are actually more likely to agree 
with liberal immigration policies upon receiving the unemployment treatment. Perhaps low-
income respondents are less likely to support open immigration policies upon receiving an 
unemployment treatment because these respondents are more sensitive to job loss. The 
combination of less income and the potential of losing employment opportunities as immigrants 
enter the U.S. likely sparks discontent with immigration policy. Looking at this result in a larger 
context, the result implies that under periods of economic distress, where unemployment is 
prevalent, a utility maximizing politician would be wise to promote immigration policies that are 
not quick to open borders.8  
 Looking at the unemployment treatment’s impact on welfare, the treatment led high-
income respondents to be .24 points more likely to strongly disagree that welfare in the U.S. is 
too large. Although insignificant, the unemployment treatment indeed decreases lower income 
respondents’ support of welfare in the U.S. (Table 2).  The results for healthcare and student loan 																																																								
7 See appendix for graphical analysis of the control-treatment differentials both dichotomously 
and continuously.   
8 This is given that a significant amount of the population is low income and given that a 
significant amount of these low-income individuals are prone to voting. While sound 
theoretically, these assumptions may not hold in reality. Yet, these assumptions may have help 
up quite well in the 2016 Presidential election whereby a candidate who promoted nationalistic 
immigration policies and relied on low-income voters won.  
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debt forgiveness prove insignificant, but the treatment effect appears to work against H2 in both 
cases: the treatment leads to increased support for the ACA and debt forgiveness opportunities.  
 Aside from the results on economic pessimism, Table 3 demonstrates that the GDP 
treatment had no significant effects on policy opinions for either low or high-income 
respondents. Looking at the coefficient signs for low-income respondents, mixed results for H2 
arise (although statistical insignificance makes these interpretations quite weak). The GDP 
treatment appears to make low income respondents less likely to agree with open immigration 
policies (similar to the result of the unemployment treatment), less likely to support the ACA 
(contrary to the unemployment treatment), less supportive of welfare (similar to the 
unemployment treatment), and more supportive of debt forgiveness programs (similar to the 
unemployment treatment). Interestingly, the GDP treatment had the exact opposite effect for 
high-income respondents on all policies (not including economic outlook). Insignificance hinders 
the ability to conclude that these opinions are truly opposite upon receiving the same treatment, 
yet the results appear to suggest that there is an income threshold whereby a change in GDP 
could shift policy opinions in different directions.  
 Looking at respondent income more broadly also provides another avenue to check how 
opinions on policies shift. Figure 6 in the appendix presents the results of an OLS interaction 
regression between each policy, the treatment, income, and an income-treatment interaction 
(where income is left as continuous rather than dichotomized as per H2). For the BU treatment 
group, the results prove insignificant: the interaction between income and the treatment has little 
explanatory power in this sample. For the MTurk unemployment treatment, the income-
treatment interaction proves significant and demonstrates that higher income respondents were 
more likely to agree with less stringent immigration policies upon receiving an unemployment 
treatment. Interestingly, the coefficients for the treatment and income separately tell the opposite 
story (positive sign): as one receives the treatment and increases their income they support 
immigration less, but the interaction of these variables leads an individual to be more supportive 
of open immigration (negative sign). The GDP treatment group follows the same pattern for 
immigration. The interaction between the treatment and income reveals a propensity to support 
immigration, while income and the treatment separately indicate opposition towards 
immigration. Hence for the MTurk data, the income-treatment interaction dampens the 
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propensity to oppose more liberal immigration policies. The interaction results for the remaining 
policies remain insignificant. 
  In summary, the only significant evidence in favor of H2 is derived from the 
unemployment treatment’s propensity to push lower income respondents to oppose open 
immigration policies. Although insignificant, the coefficient directions for all three samples 
provide mixed results on H2: the treatments do not consistently push lower income respondents 
to oppose the policies in question. The closest the results arrive to consistently opposing the 
policies is under the GDP treatment, yet these coefficients prove insignificant. Continuous 
income and treatment interactions reveal that for the MTurk respondents, the interaction 
dampens the propensity to oppose open immigration policy. Therefore, the results provide little 
evidence for H2: situations of economic fear do not systematically cause lower income 
individuals to oppose social policies.  
 
IV. Testing Hypothesis 3 and Other Results  
The last hypothesis contends that between the two MTurk treatment groups, the results 
for the unemployment treatment group will be more pronounced than for the GDP treatment 
group according to the direction of support predicted in H1. Therefore, under H3 the 
unemployment treatment group should be less supportive of immigration, more supportive of the 
Affordable Care Act, more supportive of welfare, and more supportive of student loan debt 
forgiveness, relative to the GDP treatment. Yet, since testing H1 revealed no significant 
differences between the control and treatment groups, any differences between the two treatment 
groups on the four policies in question are unlikely to be explained by the treatments but by 
extraneous factors.  
Yet, the results from H2 provide some support for the contention that the unemployment 
effect will be stronger than the GDP effect. Firstly, the unemployment treatment provided 
statistically significant effects for both immigration and welfare in H2, whereas the GDP 
treatment provided no significant results. In addition, when comparing the coefficient sizes for 
economic optimism, the unemployment treatment made both high and low-income respondents 
more likely to view the economy negatively relative to the GDP treatment (Table 2 and 3). 
Although not all significant, the coefficients for immigration and debt forgiveness are also larger 
for the unemployment treatment (low income). For the high-income comparison, the 
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unemployment treatment effect is larger for immigration and welfare. This provides weak 
evidence supporting H3. Citizens appear to be more attuned to changes in unemployment than 
GDP. This proves logical: unemployment is a simple concept; it impacts all citizens at both the 
pocketbook and sociotropic levels. GDP is a more abstract, academic concept that individuals 
may not be able to comprehend. Respondents may be less likely to place GDP into the context of 
the national economy’s health or their own personal situation.  
Yet, other tests could reveal different characteristics where respondents differ. The first 
test generates a dichotomous variable for party identification, where Democrats are 0 and 
Republicans are 1. Contrary to the different treatments, all results are significant for both 
samples (See Figure 13 in appendix). For economic outlook, Republicans are more likely to have 
more positive economic outlooks than Democrats. Republican identification correlates with 
disagreeing that the U.S. should provide equal opportunities for immigrants. For healthcare, 
Republican identification correlates strongly against supporting the Affordable Care Act: 
Republicans are 1.31 points more likely to strongly disagree that the government should continue 
providing opportunities for health insurance. This result is predictable given partisan sentiment, 
and timely as the Republican dominated House of Representatives tries to repeal or restructure 
the Affordable Care Act. Looking at student loan debt forgiveness provides somewhat 
predictable results: Republicans are statistically significantly more likely to disagree that there 
should be more opportunities for debt forgiveness. Therefore, it appears that party identification 
acts as a stronger predictor than the treatment effects. This finding is solidified within the 
literature and complies with The American Voter and subsequent studies (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, Stokes, 1960, Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, Weisberg, 2008).   
Lastly, although not possible to test within the BU student group,9 testing for differences 
between individuals with different education may reveal a more powerful explanatory variable. 
OLS regressions between the four policies and the education level of all MTurk respondents 
(coded 1-6 for less than high school through a masters degree or more) provide significant results 
for immigration, healthcare, and welfare (Figure 14). As one’s education increases, they are 
more likely to support immigration, support the Affordable Care Act, and support welfare 
opportunities. To further test this result, an indicator for those with at least a college degree and 
running the same regression confirms the results from the prior education regression. As Figure 																																																								
9 The BU sample lacks variation in education level; so testing for differences is not possible. 
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14 in the appendix demonstrates, as one receives at least college education they are more likely 
to support immigration, the Affordable Care Act, and support welfare opportunities (economic 
optimism and debt are both insignificant). Therefore, while not as substantial as party 
identification, education predicts policy support within the MTurk sample.  
In summary, the control-treatment experiment deployed to both an undergraduate and 
MTurk sample demonstrated a fairly weak treatment effect for all groups. The largest treatment 
effects arise for respondents’ opinions on economic outlook. Questioning whether differences 
exist between the two groups by income level confirms the treatment’s significant increase in 
economic pessimism and exposes significant results for immigration and welfare. There are 
differences between high and low-income respondents, but the economic fear treatments are not 
responsible for these results. Lastly, the analysis provides weak support for the idea that 
respondents are more sensitive to unemployment shocks than GDP shocks and suggests that 
differences in opinion are better explained by respondent partisanship, income, and education. It 
is these latter economic and demographic characteristics that policymakers and politicians should 
capitalize on when forming proposals or campaign strategy.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
A robust economic voting literature demonstrates the propensity of the American public 
to process economic information in either a sociotropic or pocketbook manner and translate that 
into a vote supporting or detracting from the incumbent candidate or party (Tufte, 1978, Key, 
1957, Downs 1966, Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, Kramer, 1983, Fiorina 1981, Lewis-Beck, 2000, 
Hopkins, 2012, Bartels, 2013, and Ansolabehere et. al, 2014). These studies have mainly focused 
on the tangible voting outcomes that arrive as a result of economic policy and shocks. This paper 
instead questions to what degree social policies are impacted by economic fear in order to inform 
policymakers on the areas that are most vulnerable during times of financial distress. The 
analysis relies on techniques provided by modern political economy research: namely surveys 
and control-treatment experiments (Feldman and Zaller, 1992, Anderson et. al, 2000, Brader et. 
al, 2008, Hopkins, 2012, Reeves and Gimpel, 2012, Woon, 2012, Cavaillé and Trump, 2014, 
Hansford and Gomez, 2015, Simonovitz, 2015, Trump, 2016, and Banks, 2016). This paper 
posits two differences in policy opinions, one predicts directions of policy support due simply to 
receiving an economic fear treatment, and another seeks differences not only due to the treatment 
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but by income as well. In addition, this piece posited that receiving an economic anxiety 
treatment focused on unemployment would have stronger effects than receiving one based on 
poor GDP performance.  
The experimental findings demonstrate that an economic anxiety treatment alone does 
not have enough power to shape individual’s opinions on social policies. Immigration, the 
Affordable Care Act, welfare, and student loan debt forgiveness provide insignificant differences 
between the control and treatment groups in both samples. Yet, an economic fear treatment 
significantly impacts individuals’ outlook on the economy at large: increased economic anxiety 
hinders one’s outlook on the national economy. Subsequently, the income-treatment interaction 
results demonstrate there are few policies whereby lower income respondents will decrease 
support under an economic fear treatment. While insignificant, the results demonstrating low-
income support for policies are somewhat contrary to Trump’s adjustment hypothesis, as 
inequality and additional economic anxiety do not consistently lead respondents to oppose out 
groups or policies that provide support to others (2016). Lastly, the experimental findings 
provide weak support for the notion that individuals are more responsive to changes in 
unemployment than GDP, which concurs with Banks, Brader et. al, Simonovitz, Bloom and 
Price, and Kiewiet (2016, 2008, 2015, 1975, and 1981). Moreover, the experimental results 
confirm long-held findings from The American Voter and subsequent studies (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, Stokes, 1960 and Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, Weisberg, 2008). Namely, 
political party identification, education, and income seem to be the best identifiers to predict 
individual’s opinions on policies or support for candidates. While not novel in any regard, 
upholding these classical findings maintains the relevance of political identification in society 
and the importance of obtaining this data when running individual-level political analyses. 
Furthermore, this analysis demonstrates that individuals are attuned to the state of the economy 
and are capable of forming sociotropic opinions in this manner. Yet, politicians should recognize 
and potentially take advantage of the fact that individuals are not consistently prone to changing 
policy opinions in wake of economic anxiety.  
Regarding analytical weaknesses, the present research has several drawbacks. Firstly, in 
research design, using a survey methodology to attempt to capture the effects of economic 
anxiety leaves room for bias and non-captured effects that are immeasurable in quantitative 
analysis. Secondly, as mentioned in the Research Design section, the timing of the present 
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research may limit the causal interpretations due to difficulties disentangling whether economic 
anxiety stemmed from the treatment or due to the unpredictable political climate since President 
Trump assumed office. While using a control-treatment design mitigates this weakness, there is 
always the possibility of systematic bias whereby randomly assigned control respondents had a 
lower (higher) baseline of economic anxiety than the randomly assigned treatment respondents. 
Thirdly, the treatment effect findings may be weak if individuals did not comprehend or translate 
the real meaning of the treatment. Regarding methodology, this demonstrates the tradeoff 
between the desire to embed lots of information into a treatment and respondents’ potentially 
short attention spans. While the economic optimism results reveal that respondents indeed read 
and were able to translate the treatment into a differing view of the economy, survey ordering 
could be responsible for this result. Had the questions about policies immediately preceded the 
treatment articles, respondents may have better maintained and translated this information into 
their opinions. Additionally, some unreliability could have arisen from using a newspaper article 
to deliver the treatment. Perhaps a more efficient way of providing an economic anxiety 
treatment would be a short video clip or news piece. This would be more costly and difficult to 
produce relative to writing the news articles.  
In addition, for the Boston University sample, the tradeoff between recruitment and 
reliable data proved somewhat significant. Although a large number of students took the survey, 
a significant number did not complete the survey and were subsequently dropped from the 
analysis. Therefore, obtaining a larger sample for the same price using MTurk may enhance 
future studies with a limited budget. Lastly, the ideal version of this sample would take 
advantage of a natural experiment: this would enhance external and internal validity of any 
analysis. This could be observed at the national level or more locally. A keen researcher would 
measure policy opinions in a time series and compare the data between individuals who were 
harmed by economic change and those unharmed. Ideally, one could control for all differences 
including income, political identification, and education level. Therefore any observed difference 
in opinion would be derived from economic anxiety: for example a factory closure or increased 
unemployment where individuals in one region are harmed and others are not.  
As noted in the introduction, the present research fits well into the political and economic 
climate that has defined the United States since The Great Recession. Americans have become 
more attuned to how the economy impacts their nation and their individual lives, and they 
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translate this into political behavior. Scholars should continue questioning how changes in 
economic variables impact support for social policies to gain a better understanding of how these 
pillars interact to define the American status quo. While this analysis demonstrates that the link 
between economic anxiety and policy support (or opposition) is fairly weak at present, society at 
large would benefit from continued research in this area in order to maximize welfare. Perhaps, 
present political behavior may be better explained by voters’ racist and sexist attitudes 
(Schaffner, 2016). In fact, 2016 election data reveals that the education gap and subsequent racist 
and sexist tendencies of less-than-college educated intended voters best predicted a vote for 
Trump (Schaffner, 2016). The present analysis indirectly concords with these findings, as better 
educated respondents, who are less likely to hold racist or sexist attitudes, are more likely to 
support policies in line with a Democratic platform (Schnaffer, 2016). A better comprehension of 
how individuals respond to economic anxiety allows policymakers to better tailor proposals to 
meet the exact demands of constituents and prevent deadweight loss in the lawmaking procedure.  
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Appendix 
Survey Questions and Corresponding Numerical Code   
 
Question 1: How Optimistic do you feel about the future of the American Economy?  
1. Very Optimistic 
2. Somewhat Optimistic 
3. Somewhat Pessimistic 
4. Very Pessimistic  
 
Question 2: How strongly do you agree/disagree with the following statement: Media reporting on the economy is 
easy to understand. 
1. Strongly Agree  
2. Agree  
3. Disagree  
4. Strongly disagree  
 
Question 3: Please rate how strongly you agree/disagree with each of the following statements: The United States 
should allow immigrants to enter the country legally and should provide means for immigrants to have quality 
education, jobs, and a path to citizenship. 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree  
3. Somewhat disagree  
4. Strongly disagree  
 
Q4 - The United States should continue providing opportunity for all citizens to purchase healthcare through the 
Affordable Care Act, and those who do not comply should pay the associated tax. 
1. Strongly agree  
2. Somewhat agree  
3. Somewhat disagree  
4. Strongly disagree  
 
Q5 - Welfare in the United States is too large; the government supports too many individuals who do too little to 
support themselves financially. The United States should provide fewer opportunities for handouts. 
1. Strongly agree  
2. Somewhat agree  
3. Somewhat disagree  
4. Strongly disagree  
 
Q6 - The United States does not provide enough opportunity for student loan debt forgiveness; there should be more 
public opportunities for individuals to have their educational debts excused. 
1. Strongly agree  
2. Somewhat agree  
3. Somewhat disagree  
4. Strongly disagree  
 
Q7 - The United States should fully intervene in the civil war in Syria; they should not only commit to aerial attacks 
but should put soldiers on the ground in order to help end the conflict. 
1. Strongly agree  
2. 3. Somewhat agree  
3. 3. Somewhat disagree  
4. Strongly disagree  
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Q8 - Please mark the age range you correspond to: 
1. 18-25 
2. 25-30 
3. 31-40 
4. 41-50 
5. 51-60 
6. 61-70 
7. 71-80 
8. 81-90 
9. 90+  
 
Q9. Gender  
1. Male  
2. Female  
3. Other  
 
Q10. Race  
1. American Indian or Alaska Native  
2. Asian  
3. 3. Black, non Hispanic  
4. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander  
5. White, non Hispanic  
6. Hispanic or Latino or Spanish Origin of any race  
7. Race and Ethnicity Unknown  
 
Q11. Education  
1. Less than high school  
2. High school  
3. Some college  
4. Bachelors  
5. Professional degree  
6. Masters or More  
 
Q12. US Citizen  
1. Yes  
2. No  
 
Q13. Party  
1. Democrat  
2. Lean Democrat  
3. Independent  
4. Lean Republican  
5. Republican  
 
Q14. Income  
1. 0-25k  
2. 26-50k  
3. 51-75k  
4. 76-100k  
5. over 100k  
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Treatment and Control Articles (reproduced for easier reading)  
BU Control Article  
 
BU Treatment Article  
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MTurk Control Article  
 
MTurk Unemployment Treatment Article  
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MTurk GDP Treatment Article  
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Boston University Respondents 
   Mean   Standard Deviation  Min   Max  
 
Age    1.08  0.42    1  5 
 
Gender    1.68  0.47    1  3 
 
Race    4.52  1.40    1  7 
 
Education   3.79  0.80    2  6 
 
US Citizen   1.08  0.27    1  2 
 
Political Party   1.86  1.05    1  5 
 
Income    1.40  0.82    1  5 
 
Treatment  -  -    0  1 
 
N=258 
Control=128 
Treatment=130 
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MTurk Respondents  
   Mean   Standard Deviation  Min   Max 
 
Age    2.92  0.99    1  4 
 
Gender    1.41  0.50    1  3 
 
Race    4.62  1.10    1  7 
 
Education   3.82  1.13    1  6 
 
US Citizen  1.01  0.12    1  2 
 
Political Party   2.46  1.33    1  5 
 
Income    2.26  1.09    1  5 
 
Unemp. Treatment -  -    0  1 
 
GDP Treatment  -  -    0  1 
N=889 
Control= 289 
Unemployment Treatment=325 
GDP Treatment=275 
     
Figure 1. 
Economic Optimism 
 
Unemployment  Very    Somewhat Somewhat Very  Total  
Treatment  Optimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Pessimistic 
 
No  (%)    15.57  55.71  22.84  5.88  100.00   
Yes  (%)   3.69  28.62  52.62  15.08  100.00 
Total  (%)   9.28  41.37  38.60  10.75  100.00 
 
Pearson chi2 (3)=97.57 
Pr-0.00 
N=614 
 
Figure 2. 
                     Economic Optimism 
GDP   Very    Somewhat Somewhat Very  Total  
Treatment  Optimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Pessimistic 
 
No (%)    15.57  55.71  22.84  5.88  100.00 
Yes  (%)   5.82  37.82  47.64  8.73  100.00  
Total  (%)   10.82  46.99  34.93  7.27  100.00 
 
Pearson chi2 (3)=48.37 
P=0.00 
N=564 
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Figure 3. Chi Square Results of Economic Optimism by BU Treatment  
 
     Economic Optimism 
  
BU   Very    Somewhat Somewhat Very  Total  
Treatment  Optimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Pessimistic 
 
No (%)    4.69  51.56  38.28  5.47  100.00 
Yes  (%)   2.33  43.41  41.09  13.18  100.00  
Total  (%)   3.50  47.47  39.69  9.34  100.00 
 
Pearson chi2 (3)=6.13 
P=0.11 
N=257 
 
 
 
Figure 4. H1 OLS Regression Results  
Unemployment Treatment   Coefficient   Standard Error  
 
Immigration    0.07   (0.08) 
Affordable Care Act    -0.00   (0.09) 
Welfare      0.08   (0.09) 
Debt Forgiveness    -0.05   (0.08) 
 
GDP Treatment     Coefficient   Standard Error  
 
Immigration    0.05   (0.08) 
Affordable Care Act    0.00   (0.09) 
Welfare      -0.02   (0.09) 
Debt Forgiveness    0.01   (0.08)  
 
BU Treatment     Coefficient   Standard Error  
 
Immigration    -0.00   (0.10) 
Affordable Care Act   0.01   (0.11) 
Welfare      0.02   (0.11) 
Debt Forgiveness    -0.04   (0.11)  
 
*10% significance  
**5% significance  
***1% significance  
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Figure 5. H2 OLS Regression Results (Reproduced in Paper)  
 
Unemployment Treatment    
N:  614     Low Income    High Income   
 
Economic Pessimism    0.65    0.51 
     (0.08)***    (0.10)*** 
 
Immigration    0.20    -0.15 
     (0.10)**    (0.13) 
 
Healthcare     -0.00    0.02    
     (0.11)    (0.15) 
 
Welfare     -0.01    0.24 
     (0.10)    (0.15)* 
 
Debt      -0.11    0.05 	 	 	 	 	 (0.09) 	 	 	 (0.15)	
 
GDP Treatment 
N: 564       Low Income    High Income   
 
Economic Pessimism    0.46    0.32 
     (0.08)***    (0.10)*** 
 
Immigration    0.16    -0.13 
     (0.10)    (0.13) 
 
Healthcare    0.03     -0.06 
     (0.12)    (0.16) 
 
Welfare     -0.11    0.16 
     (0.11)    (0.15) 
 
Debt      -0.10    0.17 
     (0.10)    (0.14) 
 
BU Treatment  
N: 257      Low Income    High Income   
 
Economic Pessimism    0.22    0.44 
     (0.10)**    (0.33) 
 
Immigration    -0.01    -0.02 
     (0.11)    (0.36) 
 
Healthcare     0.05    -0.30    
     (0.12)    (0.36) 
 
Welfare     0.03    -0.08 
     (0.12)    (0.33) 
 
Debt      -0.05    -0.17 	 	 	 	 	 (0.11) 	 	 	 (0.34) 
 
*10% significance  
**5% significance  
***1% significance  	
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Figure 6. OLS Income Interaction Regressions (using Income Continuously)  
 Unemployment Treatment   Coefficient   Standard Error  
 
Economic Pessimism   
 Income      -0.05    (0.04)   
 Treatment    0.72    (0.14)*** 
 Income*Treatment    -0.05    (0.06) 
 Constant     2.31    (0.10)*** 
Immigration  
 Income      0.09    (0.05)* 
 Treatment    0.53    (0.18)*** 
 Income*Treatment    -0.21    (0.07)*** 
 Constant     1.77    (0.13)*** 
Affordable Care Act 
 Income      0.04    (0.06) 
 Treatment    0.16    (0.21) 
 Income*Treatment    -0.07    (0.08) 
 Constant     2.25    (0.15)*** 
Welfare  
 Income      -0.28    (0.06)*** 
 Treatment    -0.11    (0.19) 
 Income*Treatment    0.08    (0.08) 
 Constant     3.09    (0.14)*** 
Debt  
 Income      0.11    (0.05)** 
 Treatment    -0.08    (0.19) 
 Income*Treatment    0.01    (0.07) 
 Constant     1.72    (0.13)*** 
 
GDP Treatment     Coefficient   Standard Error  
 
Economic Pessimism  
 Income      -0.05    (0.04) 
 Treatment    0.45    (0.14)***  
 Income*Treatment    -0.02    (0.06)  
 Constant      2.31    (0.10)*** 
Immigration  
 Income      0.09    (0.05)*  
 Treatment    0.42    (0.17)** 
 Income*Treatment    -0.16    (0.07)** 
 Constant     1.77    (0.12)*** 
Affordable Care Act 
 Income      0.04    (0.59) 
 Treatment    0.00    (0.21) 
 Income*Treatment    0.00    (0.08) 
 Constant     2.26    (0.15)*** 
Welfare  
 Income      -0.23    (0.06)***  
 Treatment    -0.25    (0.20) 
 Income*Treatment    0.11    (0.08) 
 Constant     3.10    (0.14)*** 
Debt  
 Income      0.11    (0.05)** 
 Treatment    -0.25    (0.19) 
 Income*Treatment    0.11    (0.07) 
 Constant     1.72    (0.13)*** 
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BU Treatment     Coefficient   Standard Error  
 
Economic Pessimism  
 Income      -0.16    (0.08)*   
 Treatment    0.20    (0.17)  
 Income*Treatment    0.02    (0.11) 
 Constant      2.66    (0.12)*** 
Immigration  
 Income      0.05    (0.09)   
 Treatment    -0.07    (0.21) 
 Income*Treatment    0.04    (0.13)  
 Constant     1.40    (0.15)***   
Affordable Care Act 
 Income     -0.10    (0.10)   
 Treatment    -0.18    (0.22)  
 Income*Treatment    0.11    (0.14) 
 Constant     1.90    (0.16)*** 
Welfare  
 Income Dummy    0.08    (0.10)   
 Treatment    0.09    (0.22)   
 Income*Treatment    -0.04    (0.13) 
 Constant     3.08    (0.25)*** 
Debt 
 Income      0.15    (0.10)* 
 Treatment    -0.09    (0.21) 
 Income*Treatment    0.02    (0.13) 
 Constant     1.52    (0.15)*** 
 
*10% significance  
**5% significance  
***1% significance  
 
Figure 7. Unemployment Treatment and Economic Optimism by Income 
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Figure 8. GDP Treatment Economic Optimism by Income 
                                    
 
 
Figure 9. BU Treatment Economic Optimism by Income 
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Figure 10. Unemployment Treatment: Economic Optimism by Income 
                             
 
Figure 11. GDP Treatment: Economic Optimism by Income 
                             
     
 
Figure 12. BU Treatment: Economic Optimism by Income 
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Figure 13. Testing Opinions by Party Identification (OLS Regressions)  
 
MTurk Sample 
Policy    Coefficient  Standard Error  
 
Economic Pessimism  -0.37   (0.06)*** 
Immigration   0.73   (0.07)*** 
Affordable Care Act   1.31   (0.09)*** 
Welfare     -1.22   (0.07)*** 
Debt     0.79   (0.07)*** 
 
N=678  
 
BU Sample  
Policy    Coefficient  Standard Error  
 
Economic Pessimism  -0.73   (0.17)*** 
Immigration   0.48   (0.21)*** 
Affordable Care Act   1.31   (0.21)*** 
Welfare    -1.70   (0.19)***  
Debt     0.79   (0.20)*** 
 
N= 199 
*10% significance  
**5% significance  
***1% significance  
 
 
Figure 14. Testing Opinions By Education (OLS Regressions: MTurk sample only due to no 
variation in BU Sample)  
 
Continuous Education 
    Coefficient  Standard Error  
 
Economic Pessimism   0.00   (0.02) 
Immigration    -0.15   (0.03)*** 
Affordable Care Act   -0.07   (0.04)* 
Welfare     0.08   (0.03)*** 
Debt    0.00   (0.03) 
 
 
Education Dummy  
 
Policy    Coefficient  Standard Error  
 
Economic Pessimism  0.02   (0.39) 
Immigration   -0.34   (0.06)*** 
Affordable Care Act   -0.16   (0.10)* 
Welfare     0.17   (0.07)*** 
Debt     -.07   (0.07) 
 
N=889 
*10% significance  
**5% significance  
***1% significance  
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Figure 15. BU Economic Pessimism by Party ID (0 Democrat, 1 Republican) 
 
Figure 16.BU Immigration by Party ID (0 Democrat, 1 Republican) 
 
 
Figure 17. BU Affordable Care Act by Party ID (0 Democrat, 1 Republican) 
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Figure 18. BU Welfare by Party ID (0 Democrat, 1 Republican) 
 
Figure 19. BU Debt by Party ID (0 Democrat, 1 Republican) 
 
 
 
Figure 20. MTurk Economic Pessimism by Party ID (0 Democrat, 1 Republican) 
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Figure 21. MTurk Immigration by Party ID (0 Democrat, 1 Republican) 
 
Figure 22. MTurk Affordable Care Act by Party ID (0 Democrat, 1 Republican) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. MTurk Welfare by Party ID (0 Democrat, 1 Republican) 
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Figure 24. MTurk Debt by Party ID (0 Democrat, 1 Republican) 
 
 
Figure 24. MTurk Immigration by Education (0, Less than College, 1 College or More) 
 
 
 
Figure 25. MTurk Affordable Care Act by Education (0, Less than College, 1 College or More) 
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Figure 26. MTurk Welfare by Education (0, Less than College, 1 College or More) 
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